Panic? Or Don’t Panic? Which Is It?

by Peter O’Neil

Many fantasy baseball experts admonish those who express nervousness over a high-priced superstar’s slow start. “Don’t panic!” they say. “Players always revert to their norm.” Others chirp in on public forums: “It’s only April, the stats are meaningless.”

And the most obnoxious will annoyingly declare:  “Gee, I wish you were in my league. I’d take you to the cleaners, offering you my red-hot Chris Duncan for your slow-starting Carlos Lee.”

It is of course true that you should never trade a slumping elite player for a hot-starting unknown.  But given all the available information and expertise out there these days, are there really players in remotely serious leagues who make those kinds of deals?  Even if they did the scorn heaped down on them assures they will too petrified to do it  again, and the beneficiary would earn a “shark” reputation that could make future trading difficult.

To me the real question is this: Should we really be so quick to dismiss April stats? Is a star’s slow start, or an unheralded player’s heroics, really meaningless?

I have always felt that April stats are fairly significant.  And I’d like to cite some research I’ve been looking over, produced by one of fantasy’s top gurus, to back up my views.

Ron Shandler’s 2009 edition of the Forecaster reproduced his study of the 2005 season that looked at players who had surprisingly good, or bad, years, and sought to determine if these breakouts and breakdowns were identifiable by the end of April.

The study concluded that a little over 40 per cent of hitters and pitchers who earned $10 more than projected for the whole season were red-hot in April.

More than half of hitters (56 per cent) and 3/4 of pitchers (74 per cent) who earned $10 less than projected were also identifiable in April.

Shandler’s conclusion was that, for other than pitchers about to have lousy years, “April was not a strong leading indicator.”

The study also looked at major breakouts — players earning $20-$25 more than predicted — and found these were identifiable in 45 per cent of the cases. His conclusion: “April surgers are less than a 50-50 proposition to maintain that level all season.”

I love the research, so once again the fantasy baseball community has benefited from Shandler’s great work. But I have a different perspective on the conclusion.

If everyone in fantasy agreed that 100 per cent of players off to amazing, or miserable, starts in April were going to maintain that level, then this study would poke a pin in that balloon. But we know that’s not the case.

The fact is that the vast majority of fantasy participants are inherently skeptical of players who come out of nowhere to start strongly.   They might find it interesting that Chris Duncan is hitting more than .350 right now, but how many would pay a price to have him on their teams?

Similarly, while owners might be a little worried right now that David Ortiz is well under the Mendoza line, it’s going to be a while before they give up on the idea that their star asset will come back with a vengeance. Of course, experts constantly urging them to be patient and assuring them that players revert to the mean reinforces this view.

So I doubt very much if fantasy players realize there is at least a 40 per cent chance the player performing well above expectations will remain that way, and that more than half of the league’s slumping hitters, and three-quarters of struggling pitchers, won’t recover.

A second study, also by Shandler, reinforced my view.

Last May he proposed a theoretical trade of hot April starters (including Fred Lewis, Ryan Doumit, Kyle Lohse, Chipper Jones, Cliff Lee among them) for strugglers (like Robinson Cano, Justin Verlander, Kenji Johjima, Austin Kearns, Adam Laroche, and Roy Oswalt). He suggested tongue somewhat in cheek that the buyer of the slow starters would have to be nuts to accept such a group of struggling bums as Oswalt and Cano.

Of course, his point was that the former group of overachievers were obvious sell-high candidates, while the underachievers were ideal buy-low opportunities. He said the goal of this column was to “prove that early season mass hysteria” about hot or cold starters “is really tiresome.” He stated as fact that his underachievers would out-earn the overachievers, and made a joking reference to the absurdity of anyone who would rather have Lohse over Verlander.

But the result was a shocker, to me and I assume to Shandler. The 10 so-called overachievers actually performed better the rest of the way, with Lohse playing a key role by clearly pitching better than Verlander.

I think these results open our eyes to changing realities. Shandler deliberately chose the overachieving Doumit among the group of players he wanted to trade away, and cited the underachieving Johjima as an ideal target. The message here was obvious: the smart money should be betting on Johjima, since he had a longer track record and the projected stats were so much better.

Yet here we are a year later and Doumit is an elite catching option and Johjima is unrosterable in numerous formats.

Things change, and sometimes the signs are obvious in April.

So what can we do as fantasy players with this information? Well, that’s a tough one. Ideally, fantasy experts should be doing a version of the 2005 study every year to give us more information on the springtime genesis of breakouts and breakdowns.

But until then? I’m not advocating panic trades, of course. It’s still going to be tough figuring out which of your hot starters is headed for a career year. And it will always be hard to try to sell struggling players, particularly if you have a reputation of being one of the smarter cookies in your league. People will assume you know there’s an underlying problem.

But if there’s a shark in your league trolling for slow-starters, and offering some flash-in-the-pan who’s leading the league in RBIs, don’t necessarily assume you’re about to be duped.  There’s a not-unreasonable chance that you could be getting a stud for a dud.

(Peter O’Neil is the Paris-based Europe correspondent for a Canadian news agency. He writes for www.canada.com/fantasybaseball)

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The NEW RegFly.com

I used to have my sites registered at registerfly.com, a registrar that was cheap. It seemed, at the time, that since there was little value added by the expensive registrars, and there was little reason to pay three times the annual registration fee.

As godaddy has proved, that assessment was right. Except that registerfly.com was owned by a thief who sucked the company’s capital dry. (Google registerfly.com and prostitutes to get the whole story.) Registerfly.com eventually imploded, stole all the money that was in accounts, and made many of us waste countless hours trying to recover our domain names. Many didn’t make it out.

In the last few weeks I’ve been spammed repeatedly by regfly.com, the NEW regfly.com. The New Regfly.com that doesn’t have a positive balance in my account.

I don’t have any idea why someone would want to remind you of their connection to registerfly.com, but if you sign up with them you can’t say you haven’t been warned. These are stealing liars. Don’t do business with them.

The Cutter: Magic Pitch

Fantasy Bullpen

I liked Kyle Davies going into this year because of his age, his pedigree, his good spring, and I knew he had added a cutter. What I didn’t know was how big a weapon the cutter seems to be. 

If Alex Gershwind is right, it’s a big weapon, though there are some open questions about his study. Most pertinent is what the sample actually is. Did he only include players who threw fewer than X number of cutters in Year 1 and more than X number of cutters in Year 2? This would tend to eliminate failures from the pool, but he doesn’t say.

He also doesn’t give a demographic profile to the guys in his study. If they were mostly not Jamie Moyer, or if they were, like Jamie Moyer, all guys on the threshhold of dropping out of the league, their typical regression to their mean career stats might show a dramatic swing.

But I have Davies in one league and I need him to do well. So I’m not looking too closely.

SweetSpot by Rob Neyer

ESPN

Rob used to be my editor at ESPN, and it was his blog post today that tipped me to that Alan Schwarz story about Diamond Mind (though the actual dead trees version is sitting in my living room, waiting for me to give up the computer screen). It also is the first day of Rob’s new blog format at ESPN.com.

I’m not sure what that means, in terms of the business, but I know that it means Rob is still writing about baseball (and I’m pretty sure he’s out from behind the pernicious pay wall) and is always well worth reading.

Game Simulations Answer Baseball’s What-Ifs

Alan Schwarz – NYTimes.com

I think the most integral bit of sabermetric revelation is Bill James’s Pythagorean Theorum, which converts team runs scored and team runs allowed into estimated won loss records. From this single metric one can seemingly assess how much success in the game is tactical and how much is brute force.

But it turns out that this inspired bit of arithmetic may conceal all the interesting parts of the game. The Theorum describes the average results of all the players, and how they convert to a won loss record. It’s all a little mechanical, even though the math is pretty irrefutable.

The interesting part arrives in somewhat recent James backtracking about Clutch hitting, and what Tom Tippett says in this story about baseball simulations. It’s possible for the numbers to add up to no effect, but that doesn’t mean there is no effect.

After a bad beat at the poker table, I used to go home and run a million iterations of the hand in Turbo Texas Hold ‘Em. What I found out, was that I usually had table stakes, but I no longer had the money.

For individual players, performance matters. It’s impossible for me not to imagine that some players are more clutch, some might be less so. But I once directed a commercial video that starred Michael Jordan, and the point he made was the clutch players made the big plays because they were the best players. They got more chances, and their successes were remembered.

I’ve always used that as the example of how a clutch player denigrates clutch performance, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that.

For managers, the sacrifice bunt, the stolen base, the batting order (as Schwarz explores here) are their tools. Do they matter? Absolutely, sometimes. Sometimes, not.

So, while it’s possible to flatten the landscape using the historical data, for someone like Tony LaRussa, who is in the game, the job is all about getting his players into a winning frame of mind, to make sure the pitcher bats eighth, and to suggest that the game is all human. For him, it’s all about the individuals, because we know the best team, as defined by the numbers, doesn’t always win.

The biggest point about Schwarz’s story is that Game Simulations Don’t Answer Baseball’s What-Ifs.

Baseball Writers Brace for the End

 WSJ.com

How much do you rely on the daily paper for your baseball coverage? The answer is more complicated than whether you read ESPN or your local paper. Many of the best baseball stories are written by newspaper writers. But if the newspapers stop sending reporters out of town with their local teams, will the coverage stop? No one knows, of course, but this story does a nice job limning the possibilities.

Opening Day

Fantasy Errata

I believe this site is called Fantasy Hurler, which is a good name.

And I actually agree with a lot of the snaps the somewhat funny writer tosses. Or should I say hurls?

And it may just be my mood right now (I’m still digesting the Arizona-Colorado game, in which I owned both starters), but I don’t think we have enough time for this.

But if you do, maybe you’ll enjoy it.

Just 25, Greinke has traveled a long, winding road and is on cusp of stardom – Kansas City Star

Joe Posnanski – Kansas City Star

I bought Zack Greinke in the American Dream League draft, part of a $50 pitching staff (Freezes Gavin Floyd $1 and Edwin Jackson $3, joined by Greinke, Duchscherer $4, the brilliant Kevin Millwood (today anyway) $2, breakout candidate Brandon McCarthy $1 and a relief crew of Balfour $5, Brandon Lyon $5, and George Sherrill $10.

Posnanski tells a good story or three, and teaches me an important thing or two about Greinke.

(The rest of the team: Victor Martinez $21, Zaun $2, Billy Butler $18, Figgins $23, Adrian Beltre $16, Iwamura $13, Jeter $20, Betemit $3, Josh Hamilton $26 freeze, Ryan Sweeney $3 freeze, Granderson $28, Delmon Young $19, Mark Teahen $10, and Travis Hafner $3. Yes, $3. He would have been a loser last year, but at least the risk isn’t great.)