NL Random Roster Notes, March 15, 2013

SAN DIEGO PADRES

Casey Kelly was working his way into the interesting territory, and then today appears to be committed to TJ. We shant see him before 2014.

Before I posted today’s updated files Mike asked me to change the newly appointed Padres second baseman, Jedd Gyorko, to $7. I failed to do that. You can do it, and the new price will also be reflected in next week’s update.

ASK ROTOMAN: Altuve v. Heyward

Hi..

I’m in a 14 team .. 5×5 rotissire league that can keep players for $5 more then they were purchased the year before..

I have Jose Altuve at $1 (can be kept for $6) but I can trade him for Jason Heyward at $16 (Can be kept for $21)..

I’ve always loved Altuve but im not buying his magazine listed price as an over $20 player.. what are your thoughts on that deal???

“Head Over Heart”

Dear HoH:

If you really love Altuve you’ll keep him for $6. He earned $25 last year. Heyward earned $26, not that much more. So the question here is why would you distrust the $22 price in the Guide, and why would you distrust it so much that Heyward would look like a better keeper.

Remember: Who you keep is a function of who would save you the most money above their keeper price on draft day, assuming you want them on your team.

If you don’t want Altuve on your team, that’s fine, but here are some facts:

Last year Altuve earned $25 in 5×5, according to me. According to Alex Patton he earned $24 in 4×4. I think it’s safe to say in an AL only league he earned in the low to mid 20s.

This year, the CBS Sports experts league paid $24 for Altuve (that’s 5×5), while in LABR he went for $19. I think Altuve is worth $22 this year (a 23 year old coming off a $25 season can only be discounted so much), but even if you buy the LABR valuation, you’re saving $13 keeping him at $6.

Jason Heyward earned $28 in 5×5 last year, I say. Alex Patton says he earned $30 in 4×4.

This year, the CBS Sports expert league paid $28 for him, while in LABR he went for $30. I think he’s worth $28 this year, but even if you buy LABR’s price (and I’m not saying that’s wrong), you’re saving $9, which is less than you’re saving with Altuve.

Plus, of course, you’re spending more than three times as much to get the savings. We just gave every rounding edge to Heyward and the numbers still point to Altuve. I think you have to keep the smaller man.

Here’s another way to look at it, assuming 10 percent inflation in your league:

If you throw back Altuve, it’s going to cost you $22 to replace him, based on LABR’s low price. That’s $16 over his freeze price.

If you throw back Heyward, it’s going to cost you $33 to replace him, based on LABR’s high price. That’s $12 over his freeze price.

The bottom line is that you’ll do better freezing Altuve and buying Heyward on draft day than vice versa, even though Heyward is the better and more attractive player overall.

Quickly,
Rotoman

Outliers: Shopping for VMart at Walmart

walmartlogo One of the players my projection and my initial bid price deviated on most was Victor Martinez. VMart was one of the game’s best hitting catchers, but he missed all of 2012 (his age 34 season) with a torn ACL. After earning $26 and $21 the preceding two years before the injury, he would seem to be a $20+ player this year, even while aging. But a closer look made me wary.

Between 1947 and 2000, four players earned 10+ dollars in their 33rd year and then missed all of their 34th year. None of them played again.

In that same time frame, five players earned 10+ dollars in their 32nd year and then missed most of their 33th year. Only one, Danny Tartabull, came back, and he had one $10 season and then retired.

During that same period, four hitters earned $10+ dollars in their 31st year and then missed most of their 32nd year. None of them earned more than $6 the next year, though two did earn $17 in their 34th year.

Obviously these are small samples, but when we widen it to include even hitters who weren’t that good the year before they missed a season, the tendency is clear: Once you’re in your 30s it’s hard to come back.

None of which is to say that VMart can’t come back. He’s swinging a hot bat so far in camp, and is going to be hitting behind Miguel Cabrera and Prince Fielder, which isn’t going to hurt. But while the projection, which doesn’t really figure in the injury, is strong, my sense of where the bargains lay makes me wary. History says he’s not likely to be nearly as good as he was before he missed the entire year, because of rustiness and conditioning and aging issues. I wouldn’t be unhappy with him for $10 at all, but he’s likely to go for more like $17-20. At that level I’ll pass.

Outliers: Finding Disagreement With Myself

Creating my initial Bids and my initial Projections are two discrete processes.

For the Bids I sit with a player’s history of Cost and Earnings, look at his age and any injury information, and try to determine how much I think he’s worth and how much I think everyone else thinks he’ll be worth, since everyone else is who I’ll be bidding against. If I’m way higher than I think the market will be, I’ll shave my bid down so that it will win, but not tower above the competition. And if I’m way lower than I think the market will be, I’ll bump my bid up to just below the market. I want to indicate my predilections, but I’m also trying to describe the market as a whole, so the prices are useful even if you disagree with me.

My projections come in two phases. The first is running a player’s historical data, including a bunch of component parts (batted ball data, mostly), through my projection formula, which also takes into account age and league and home field and league. This gives a rough idea of what players will do but has to be adjusted for playing time, and for changes in roles. After those adjustments the projections run in the Guide, and a similar but more complex set (more categories, mostly, and more time to smooth anomalies) run in the Patton $ software, at first. As spring training progresses I tweak the projections manually, mostly for playing time with veterans, but also to deal with differing situations on teams with platoons and competition and as I get a better sense of new players and their roles.

Once the projections are loaded into the Patton $ software they get priced using Alex’s formula, which is an excellent way to discover what the projection formula is telling me, especially when it differs substantially from the bid price. I’ve been going through the lists, looking at some of the substantial differences, assuming that these are players who might be of special interest this year.

HITTERS (Proj$, PK5)

Mike Trout ($49, $41): The bid predated the reports about Trout’s reporting weight. It assumes he’s not going to be nearly as good as last year, but still plenty good. THe projection is a result of increased playing time, even though he’s projected to not be nearly as good as last year. Verdict: Assuming he can run once the season starts, I would be fine standing by the projection, but I think there’s enough risk of sophomore slump and/or other issues that I wouldn’t bid more than $41.

Albert Pujols ($36, $31): The projection is remembering Albert’s past greatness. Age deductions of significance don’t kick in until the mid 30s. He could be great again, but the trend is clear. Verdict: One reason to bid $31 on Pujols is that he could put up another $36 year. But counting on an aging player to keep running is a mistake. I’ve bumped his projection down a bit, especially the SB.

PITCHERS (Proj$, PK5)

Joaquin Benoit ($15, $1) The bid is wrong. It is the standard bid for a setup guy in 5×5. Especially a guy on a team with a different pitcher named as closer (Bruce Rondon) and at least two other worthy CIW candidates (Al Albuquerque and Phil Coke). But it’s wrong because I’m projecting Benoit to be the closer at some point this year, and to do a good job at it. So, I’m bumping him to $3. That may seem silly, but that’s what he’s worth if Rondon does the job (I doubt it) or one of the other guy ends up the closer. Verdict: Right now Benoit is a closer in waiting. Maybe not even first on line. The reason closers in waiting are valuable is because you don’t pay much for them. So until there’s more smoke, I’m going to keep the bushel on this fire.

Andy Pettitte ($12, $1) He’s 41 years old this year. He only pitched 79 innings last year, and took the year before that off. It’s fine to say last year’s injury was not age related, but not many pitchers stay effective and healthy into their 40s. The projection reflects what he might do if he stays healthy, but the bid is a severe hedge. Verdict: It will be in the $8-$10 range if he emerges from ST in the rotation.

More to come!

Nate Silver Really is a Data God.

The lede of this Daily Beast story gets it right: There were two big winners on election night. I don’t recall writing much about Barack Obama on this site in the past, but Nate Silver has made regular appearances over the years, first because of his PECOTA baseball projection system, and then because of his efforts to clarify political polling.

For all the discussion about Nate’s innovations in baseball projection and political polling, one rather significant point has been missed: Nate Silver is much more a marketing guy than a statistician.

In fact, you’ll find critics all over the web who point out that Silver isn’t a statistician at all. But they’re missing the point. What Silver did with PECOTA and fivethirtyeight.com (now fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com) was to present fairly mundane “projections” and “polls” in an invigorating and easily digested way.

With PECOTA, Silver created fairly traditional weighted-average player projections, similar to Tom Tango’s famous MARCEL projections (so simple to compute they’re named after the monkey on Friends). These are solid middle-of-the-road projections. But Silver went one step farther. He then compared each player to historically similar players and used those similar players’ historical outcomes to create a wide range of possible projections (plus percentage calls for a player to Breakout or Fail) for each current player. He then assigned confidence intervals for the various outcomes, which brilliantly turned the language of predicting on its ear.

Rather than say, “the predictive model failed to account for half the home runs Player X hit,” Nate could say, “Player X hit the 20th percentile of his home run projection, perhaps because pitchers discovered he was slow identifying sliders and saw a steady diet of those all season long.” Suddenly, the predictive model was a benchmark to help identify aberrant player performance, not a faulty prediction.

Sidenote: A great deal of baseball player performance is determined by luck, so all player projections are going to deviate widely from actual performance. Accounting for that deviation while propping up the projection itself was a brilliant stroke.

With 538, Silver did something that was so obvious that others were already doing it–averaging public opinion polls. He also managed to create not only a rather successful business, but also transformed the way people are looking at journalism these days.

No doubt part of his success with 538 was the hard work he put in finding good weights for each of the polls he sampled, but his real innovation was the creation of the Chance of Winning numbers. Chance of Winning is both an easily digested number that tells you something concrete over time, in the Chance of Winning graph, and in the moment, when it lets you know the current odds that a candidate will win on election day.

On election morning this year, Silver gave President Obama a 91 (actually 90.7) percent chance of winning. He says this number is derived by running simulations, which I think must be random resets of each state’s results inside the margin of error for all the state polls he collects (I haven’t seen this process explicitly described, though it may well have been). This is a clever way to create a horse-race number out of a lot of small-differences-in-the-states contests.

There is nothing statistically bold about either PECOTA or 538, but there is lots that is informationally clear and valuable about both. That’s right in line with Silver’s thinking about predicting future events, as he makes clear in his new book, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-but Some Don’t.

Silver’s interest is in identifying and isolating the knowable empirical information in a system, be it baseball, political voting, Oscar voting, or real estate preference, and then creating a model that objectively weights discrete values so that changing conditions lead to useful predictive outcomes.  The most interesting thing about this is that Silver is completely upfront about the limitations. In many cases, as he details in the book, there is not enough signal to escape the noise’s gravity. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try to make predictions, or figure out what useful information is known about a system, but that we should honestly detail the limits we’re dealing with. Transparency, up to a point, is king.

Which seems to me remarkably clearheaded and honest and kind of brave, because contingent thinking and analysis is often looked at as dull or unimportant. Shades of gray, except when there are 50 of them, can be soporific, but Silver (almost a shade of gray himself, namewise) is usually a clear and energetic enough writer and correspondent to make his book a pleasure, if you’re ready to hear that there are limits to predictive systems. If you’re not, you should think again, because Silver’s big point is about how much we don’t know.

Which means that most of the noise about his achievements is because he presents such a clean signal. That’s the marketer in him, an affable everyman who isn’t afraid to look like a nerd (maybe he can’t help it, maybe it’s part of his method), who has figured out ways to popularize his way of looking at the data. It doesn’t hurt that he’s careful to make sure that his numbers add up.

Corrections: The Guide 2012

Some people are finding the Guide at Barnes and Nobles and Wal Marts and other stores, and some are not. We don’t have any way of knowing which stores will stock it, but a call to the manager of your favorite outlet might save you a trip if they don’t.

There is one major error in the Guide. As I noted, I rejiggered the way I calculated the rates of the different stats, using component information. The results are that the baselines turned out to be much more interesting in and of themselves. That is, I’ve had to make fewer adjustments to take into account what appeared to be good and bad luck on the field. It will take more testing to confirm, but the first round I ran indicated that these baselines are more accurate, meaning they’re closer to a player’s talent before I intervene to tweak them.

The error was the result of a small error in the number of hits projected. For some reason the formula was projecting too many hits. Not too many doubles or homers, but too many singles. The system was also projecting a small decline in AB and IP, which is a pretty standard way to account for time missed due to injuries. The problem is that the two variables moving in opposite directions meant that the projections for batting average and WHIP were too high. I did lots of comparing the projections to last year’s stats and other projection systems and didn’t catch this error. So, in the magazine the projected BA and WHIP are systemically too high. I’m sorry for the mistake, which doesn’t change any of the prices. You can download updated and corrected projections here.

Another mistake: Juan Carlos Linares is found alphabetically in the C section.

I would like to point out that the most excellent mastersball.com writer/analyst and all around St. Louis Cardinals expert, Brian Walton, was left out of the credits for the Picks and Pans. My apologies to Brian.

A note about prices: When we make the Guide I put bid prices on all sorts of players who may not start the year in the majors. My thinking is that these reflect an estimate of what these players will be worth when they are called up, taking into consideration that they might not be called up or could be called up in September. As we move through spring training I start to convert these guys to minor leaguers. For instance, I don’t think Mike Trout will be starting the year in Anaheim unless they make some significant trades, so I’ve downgraded him from $4 in the Guide to an R1, which means that if he does get called up he has star potential.

But I haven’t yet downgraded Bryce Harper, because Davey Johnson is acting like Harper is going to break camp with the big club. I’m doubtful about that, but it still seems well within the range of possibilities. The point is that this process is fluid, and not exacting. Nolan Arenado still has a price, though he’s probably going to start the year in Triple-A, because I think he has a chance of changing minds. But he probably has no more chance of making the big club than Trout. The bid prices in the March 15 update will much better reflect the realities in the camps, though there will still be open questions we’ll be mulling over.

Patton $: March 1st Update is Out!

Some little fixes have been made to the program, but the big news is the inclusion of CBS Sports Expert League prices for the AL (thus far) in the Lg1 column, and full active 4×4 and 5×5 Patton$ formulas in the excel spreadsheet. When you change a projection the prices will change. It’s hours of good fun and a big help in making lists.

Available now!

Head over to software.askrotoman.com for all the detail and to order yours today.